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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEW YORK LAW IS NO
SHIELD FOR BROOKE
A picture is worth a thousand words. And those words can haunt
you forever if you are a child model whose parent has given unrestricted
consent for publication of your picture. New York law' provides for ju-
dicial approval of contracts entered into by infants who are performing
artists.2 This statute specifically applies to actors, actresses, dancers, mu-
sicians, vocalists and professional athletes.'
In Shields v. Gross,4 the New York Court of Appeals specifically
excluded child models from coverage under New York General Obliga-
tions Law section 3-105. This exclusion prevented the plaintiff, Brooke
Shields, from obtaining a permanent injunction to stop the republication
of photographs of her in the nude.5
In 1975, at age ten, Brooke Shields was employed as a model by the
1. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-105 (McKinney 1978) (repealed effective December 31,
1983). Now covered by N.Y. ARTS AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS LAW § 35.03 (McKinney
1984).
2. California has a similar provision. CAL. CIv. CODE § 36 (West 1982). This section
provides for judicial review and approval of employment contracts for children who perform
,artistic or creative services." The statutory definition of artistic or creative services includes a
more extensive listing of entertainment occupations than the New York statute. Compare
CAL. CIV. CODE § 36(2)(b) (West 1982) and N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-105(l)(a) (McKin-
ney 1978). Despite the more extensive listing, California § 36 does not specifically include
child models in its statute. Unlike the New York statute, California § 36 does not place a time
limitation on the duration of the contract once it has been judicially approved, nor does it
allow the court to later modify or revoke the contract. This is substantially different from New
York's statute and suggests an even stronger emphasis on protection of the child's employer
rather than the child. See infra note 16. For cases interpreting the California statute, see
Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844, reh'g
denied, 335 U.S. 873 (1948) (section 36 deprives a minor of the right of disaffirmance even
after minority); Loew's, Inc. v. Elmes, 31 Cal. 2d 782, 192 P.2d 958 (1948) (section 36 autho-
rizes the court to approve a one year term of employment and grant six options to extend the
term of employment); Morgan v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 2d 665, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1963) (minor
cannot upon obtaining majority recover money paid out on minor's behalf during minority).
See also Note, California's Emancipation of Minors Act: The Costs and Benefits of Freedom
from Parental Control, 18 CAL. W.L. REv. 482 (1982).
3. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-105 (McKinney 1978).
4. 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448 N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1983).
5. The statute provides that contracts, for a period of more than three years, entered into
by child performers, will not be automatically approved by the courts. Any conditions or
covenants beyond three years may be approved if they are found to be reasonable. N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 3-105. Brooke Shields argued that her contract with photographer Garry
Gross was covered by this statute. Since the contract was for a period of more than three
years, Shields argued that the contract expired prior to the republication of the photographs.
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defendant, photographer Garry Gross. Before the photo session,
Shields's mother signed two consent forms 6 which gave Gross un-
restricted use of the photographs. The photographs, showing Shields
nude in a bathtub, were later used in several publications and in the win-
dow of a New York City store.
In 1980, Shields discovered that the photographs had appeared in a
French magazine, and that Gross planned to use them in other publica-
tions. After an unsuccessful attempt to purchase the negatives, Shields
brought a suit against Gross for compensatory and punitive damages and
for a permanent injunction to prevent further use of the photographs.7
The New York Special Term granted a preliminary injunction, stat-
ing that whether the consent forms were invalid or restrictive was a ques-
tion of fact.' If the consents were found to be valid or unrestricted, New
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 barred any cause of action.9
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the consents were
unrestrictive as to time and use. However, the trial court permanently
enjoined Gross from using the photographs in any pornographic publica-
6. The consent forms provided in pertinent part:
I hereby give the photographer, his legal representatives, and assigns, those for
whom the photographer is acting, and those acting with his permission, or his em-
ployees, the right and permission to copyright and/or use, reuse and/or publish, and
republish photographic pictures or portraits of me, or in which I may be distorted in
character, or form, in conjunction with my own or a fictitious name, on reproduc-
tions thereof in color, or black and white made through any media by the photogra-
pher at his studio or elsewhere, for any purpose whatsoever; including the use of any
printed matter in conjunction therewith.
I hereby waive any right to inspect or approve the finished photograph or adver-
tising copy or printed matter that may be used in conjunction therewith or to the
eventual use that it might be applied. (Emphasis added.)
Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
7. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
8. Id.
9. A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the pur-
pose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first
obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or
guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Emphasis added.)
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976). Section 51 provides for equitable relief and
exemplary damages for violation of section 50. For cases interpreting these statutes, see Davis
v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982) (courts construe
broadly what constitutes commercial misappropriation); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d
428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981) (previous written consent did not constitute implied authoriza-
tion for subsequent use); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472
N.Y.S.2d 254 (1984) (use of a celebrity lookalike was an impermissible misappropriation);
Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 80 Misc. 2d 531, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1975) (no violation of right
of publicity where magazine uses pictures of celebrity who had previously appeared in maga-
zine in subscription advertisement). See also Savell, Right of Privacy - Appropriation of a
Person's Name, Portrait, or Picture for Advertising or Trade Purposes Without Prior Written
Consent: History and Scope in New York, 48 ALBANY L. REv. 1 (1983).
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tions.'" The Appellate Division expanded the scope of the trial court's
injunction by enjoining the use of the photographs for advertising or
trade purposes." The parties filed cross appeals to New York's highest
court, debating the legal effect of the parental consent forms.
12
Previously, New York common law allowed an infant tremendous
freedom to disaffirm written consent given by the infant"' or by the in-
fant's parent.' 4 This protected infants from their own and their parents'
inexperience.' 5 However, the New York Legislature limited an infant's
common law right to disaffirm a contract.' 6 In General Obligations Law
section 3-105 and Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51, the legislature
provided protection for the infant's employer.' 7 The Shields court rea-
soned that Civil Rights Law section 51 was the legislature's attempt to
provide a method for the employer to obtain consent and avoid
liability. 8
The court stated that sections 50 and 51 supersede common law and
prohibit infants from disaffirming consent given by their parents. 19 Since
the consent forms signed by Shields's mother complied with the statutory
requirement of section 50, the consent was valid and could not now be
10. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 448 N.E.2d at 109-10, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
11. Shields v. Gross, 88 A.D.2d 846, 451 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1982).
12. The case was also heard by the United States District Court in New York. Shields by
Shields v. Gross, 563 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Attempting to try the issue on federal
grounds, Shields argued that her first amendment right to privacy had been violated by the
republication of the photographs and requested a preliminary injunction. The court found two
independent reasons for denying this injunction. The first was a lack of equity. The court
found that Shields's counsel had timed the litigation so as to impose unnecessary hardship on
Gross, and this strategy abused equitable remedy. Id. at 1254-55. Secondly, the court found
that Shields lacked standing for her first amendment argument because she was unable to show
any likelihood of success in her cause of action. Id. at 1256.
13. Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N.Y. 241, 181 N.E. 464 (1932).
14. Lee v. Silver, 262 A.D. 149, 28 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1941); affid, 287 N.Y. 575, 38 N.E.2d
233 (1941).
15. Joseph, 259 N.Y. at 243, 181 N.E. at 465.
16. The court cited N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-101(3), which does not allow disaffirm-
ance of a loan contract entered into by a minor husband or wife. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 346,
448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257. Also cited was N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-102(1),
which does not allow disaffirmance of hospital, medical or surgical treatment by a married
minor. Id. Section 3-103 gives veteran benefit loans to minors. Id. In citing these statutes,
the court set forth examples of minors who have taken on traditionally adult roles and who,
therefore, should be treated as adults. However, Shields, as a model, was performing a role
which is not necessarily adult, but traditionally is performed by children as well. Therefore,
the court's analogy is unsupported. Child models should not be dealt with in the same manner
as minors who have taken on traditional adult roles.
17. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257. Accord In re
Prinze v. Jonas, 38 N.Y.2d 570, 575, 345 N.E.2d 295, 299, 381 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (1976).
18. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
19. Id.
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disaffirmed by Shields.2"
The court also rejected Shields's argument that the consent forms
should be considered void because of the failure to comply with General
Obligations Law section 3-105.21 The statute refers to performing artists
and specifically lists actors, musicians, dancers and professional athletes.
It does not list models and therefore, the court reasoned, the legislature
knowingly made a distinction between child performers and child
models.22
In support of its conclusion, the court cited Education Law section
322923 (formerly section 3216(c)) which relates to the employment of
child performers and is specifically mentioned in section 3-105.24 Educa-
tion Law section 3230,25 relating to the employment of child models, was
not specifically mentioned in section 3-105.26 The court also noted that
child performers and child models are separately classified in Labor Law
section 172.27 The distinction between child performers and child mod-
els in other statutes led the court to conclude that the same distinction
applied to section 3-105; therefore, child models may not obtain judicial
approval of their employment contracts. 28 The court also stated, in dicta,
that it would be impractical to allow child models to have their contracts
judicially approved because models work from session to session with
many different photographers. The short term nature of their employ-
ment would place an unnecessary burden upon the court system.29
The Shields court has elevated the interests of business and commer-
20. Id.
21. Id. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-105 (McKinney 1978) states that:
A contract made by an infant or made by a parent or guardian of an infant,
under which (a) the infant is to perform or render services as an actor, actress,
dancer, musician, vocalist or other performing artist, or as a participant or player in
professional sports . . . may be approved by the supreme court or the surrogate's
court as provided in this section ....
22. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
23. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3229 (McKinney 1981) was repealed effective December 31, 1983.
Now covered by N.Y. ARTS AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS LAW § 35.01 (McKinney 1984).
24. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-105(2)(a) states that:
Approval of the contract pursuant to this section shall not exempt any person from
the requirements of section thirty-two hundred sixteen-c [later covered by § 3229,
but see supra note 23] of the education law or any other law with respect to licenses,
consents or authorizations required for any conduct, employment, use or exhibition
of the infant in this state . ...
25. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3230 was repealed effective December 31, 1983. Now covered by
N.Y. ARTS AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1984).
26. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 346, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
29. Id., 448 N.E.2d at 111-12, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258. For a recent case consistent with this
opinion, see Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
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cialism above the interest of protecting children.3" This decision has ren-
dered child models virtually helpless to prevent exploitation by their
employers or even by their parents. The child model's common law right
to disaffirm a contract has been eliminated by the court's decision. Un-
like child performers, who are protected under New York General Obli-
gations Law section 3-105, child models cannot have their contracts
reviewed by the court. As the court stated, section 3-105 was intended to
protect the child's employer. 3' However, section 3-105 also provides
protection for the child. The statute limits employment contracts to
three years and any contract over three years must be reasonable to be
approved. The court also retains the discretion to revoke or modify the
contract later if the court finds that the child's well-being is impaired.32
Unable to rely upon section 3-105 or the common law right to disaffirm,
child models are forever bound by the decisions of their parents, even if
those decisions are exploitive or bring embarrassment, humiliation and
distress to the child.
3 3
The court stated that such unanticipated consequences as befell
Brooke Shields can be prevented by having parents limit the time and use
authorized in the consent forms. 34 The court's suggestion avoids the
problem by simply shifting all of the responsibility for protecting the
child to the parent. Additionally, the court ignores the state's long
standing concern for the protection of children and their interests.35 If
parents do not protect their child's interest, either from lack of experi-
ence or for other reasons, the state must assume the role of parens patriae
and place the interests of minors above economic protectionism. The
distinction the court made between child models and child performers
has placed models outside of the state's protective arms. This is unfortu-
nate given the reality of a child model's career. A child's parents are not
always aware of the potential problems involved in signing a release
form. Their main concern is advancing their child's career. Therefore,
30. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 353, 448 N.E.2d at 115, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
31. See supra note 16.
32. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-105(2)(d) and (e) (McKinney 1978). Now covered by
N.Y. ARTS AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS LAW § 35.03(2)(d) and (e) (McKinney 1984).
33. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
34. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 347, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
35. Shields, 58 N.Y.2d at 350, 448 N.E.2d at 113, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Jasen, J., dissent-
ing). See also Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Sec. Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934);
Rice v. Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 55 N.E. 275 (1899); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 13
Misc. 2d 8, 174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1957), modified, 6 A.D.2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d (1958), modified,
5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
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the state has the obligation to give child models the same extraordinary
protection against exploitation as it gives child performers.
The only purpose served in distinguishing child models from child
performers is judicial economy. However, the cost of allowing models to
have their contracts reviewed by the court seems minimal compared to
the benefit of protecting these children from exploitation. Who, more
than a child model, needs protection from the continued invasion of pri-
vacy by an unscrupulous photographer given unrestricted consent to use
and reuse photographs?
Stephanie Marie Davis
